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Foreword
There is a crisis of trust in information. Technology offers 
unprecedented potential to support informed debate and 
decision-making, but the threats to reliable information and a 
healthy public debate are growing.
Politicians, regulators, platforms, news media and campaigners 
are responding, with mixed motives and uncertain results. 
While most share the view that the information crisis needs 
addressing, each stakeholder has its own interests. 
The digital platforms, news organisations, political campaigners 
and civil society all need to be part of a new integrated policy 
arrangement.
This report seeks to rise above the fray. It outlines the contours 
of the crisis and some of the evidence for the harm caused. 
It argues for a bold, structural approach to address what is a 
systemic problem of a crisis of trust in information.
Professor Sonia Livingstone, LSE
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Executive Summary
Changes in the UK media system 
have resulted in an information crisis, 
with a growing number of leaders in 
health, defence and politics concerned 
about system resilience and the 
new difficulty of achieving informed 
debate. This report argues that the 
information crisis is manifested in 
‘five giant evils’ among the UK public 
– confusion, cynicism, fragmentation, 
irresponsibility and apathy.
While the media, platforms and public authorities are responding, there are 
challenges of coordination, a lack of research and information in policy-making, 
and the potential for conflicts of interest and disputes over media freedom, 
which are hindering necessary reforms.
Policy-makers and the public are in the dark: the extent of the problem and 
whether current policy is addressing it are not clearly understood, and the 
problems created by a complex media system are ongoing. 
This report recommends actions aimed at addressing systemic problems 
and at creating conditions that will help to sustain democratic processes 
of deliberation and consensus building in the UK. Whether our longer-term 
recommendations will need to be implemented will depend on progress in 
the short term.
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Immediate Actions
Establish an Independent Platform Agency
The UK and devolved governments should introduce a new levy on UK online platforms’ revenue, 
a proportion of which should be ring-fenced to fund a new Independent Platform Agency (IPA). 
The IPA should be structurally independent of Government but report to Parliament. Its purpose, 
initially, will not be direct regulation, but rather an ‘observatory and policy advice’ function that 
will establish a permanent institutional presence to encourage the various initiatives attempting 
to address problems of information reliability.
The IPA should be established by legislation and have the 
following duties:
■■ Report on trends in news and information sharing according to a methodological framework 
subject to public consultation. This should include real data on the most shared and read 
stories, broken down by demographic group.
■■ Report on the effectiveness of self-regulation of the largest news-carrying social and search 
platforms. This should include reports on trust marks, credibility signalling, filtering and 
takedown.
■■ Mobilise and coordinate all relevant actors to ensure an inclusive and sustained programme 
in media literacy for both children and adults, and conduct evaluations of initiatives. The 
IPA should work with Ofcom to ensure sufficient evidence on the public’s critical news and 
information literacy.
■■ Report annually to Parliament on the performance of platforms’ self-regulation and the long-
term needs for possible regulatory action.
■■ Provide reports on request to other agencies such as the Electoral Commission, Ofcom 
and the Information Commissioner’s Office, to support the performance of their duties, 
according to agreed criteria. 
■■ Work closely with Ofcom and the 
Competition and Markets Authority to 
monitor the level of market dominance 
and the impact of platforms on media 
plurality and quality. 
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In order to fulfil these duties, the IPA will need the 
following powers: 
■■ Powers to request data from all the major platforms (determined by a UK advertising 
revenue threshold) on the top most shared news and information stories, referrals, 
news-sharing trends and case studies of particular stories. The types of data should 
be determined on the basis of public consultation on monitoring methodologies and 
according to a shared template that applies across different companies above the 
threshold. These data will be held by the IPA within a tight confidentiality regime to protect 
privacy and commercial sensitivities.
■■ Powers to impose fines on platforms if they fail to provide data, and to request additional 
data when a court order is granted. 
■■ The IPA’s independence from government should be established in law and protected 
financially and through security of tenure of its governing Board. The IPA should have close 
links with civil society and be transparent about how it interprets and performs its remit. 
In addition to this new institution, we make further 
recommendations: 
In the short-term:
■■ News media should continue their important work to develop quality and innovative 
revenue and distribution models. They should also continue to work with civil society and 
the platforms on signalling the credibility of content.
■■ Platforms should develop annual plans and transparent open mission statements on how 
they plan to tackle misinformation. They should work with civil society and news providers 
to develop trust marking. 
■■ Government should mobilise an urgent, integrated, new programme in media literacy. This 
could also be funded by the digital platform levy and should include digital media literacy 
training for politicians. 
■■ Parliament should bring forward legislation to introduce a statutory code on political 
advertising as recommended by the Information Commissioner.
In the medium-term (3 years):
■■ Standard setting for social media platforms. Until now, standards have been set by 
platforms themselves. If this fails to improve the UK information environment, the IPA 
should set these in collaboration with civil society, Parliament and the public.
■■ The news industry should develop a News Innovation Centre to support journalism 
innovation and quality news, funded by the levy on digital platform revenue.
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In the longer-term (5 years):
■■ The IPA should provide a permanent forum for monitoring and review of platform 
behaviours, reporting to Parliament on an annual basis. 
■■ The IPA should be asked to conduct annual reviews of ‘the state of disinformation’ that 
should include policy recommendations to a parliamentary committee. These should 
encompass positive interventions such as the funding of journalism.
Possible long term policy actions:
In the longer term it might be necessary to subject platforms to much more stringent 
regulation, including making them liable for content they host, obliging them to unbundle or 
separate internal divisions, or even breaking up their business units or introducing a more 
comprehensive system of tax incentives. 
In time, it is possible that the IPA will develop beyond a ‘monitoring and information’ function 
into a regulatory function, but it is also possible that regulatory needs can be met by a 
combination of existing bodies, as advised by the IPA.
The recommendations in this report are aimed at ensuring that the interests of citizens – 
understood as all of those residing in the UK – are protected alongside the interests of other 
stakeholders as the media system develops. This is essential if the information crisis is to be 
tackled successfully and democratic deliberation sustained.
5
The information crisis is 
systemic, and it calls for 
a coordinated long-term 
institutional response. 
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Introduction:
The Information Crisis1
Western media systems are undergoing unprecedented change. As a result, the complex 
institutional structures of self and co-regulation, professional ethics and legal privilege 
that supported democratic processes of deliberation and consensus building are being 
undermined. Established practices of journalistic verification, institutional accountability and 
the ethical ‘truth filters’ of a free, but responsible, news media are being dismantled. Citizens1 
are realising that replacing these on the new communication platforms is not straightforward.2 
Multiple competing actors need to collaborate. Any attempts to devise new structures and 
processes to achieve accountability and ethical practice should allow for the danger of 
capture by special interests and the threats they could bring to our liberty to communicate. 
The information crisis is systemic, and it calls for a coordinated long-term institutional 
response. 
Many inquiries are underway into these issues. Unlike many recent attempts to address the 
issue, including those initiated by the UK Government3 and the EU High Level Expert Group 
on Fake News and Online Disinformation,4 we do not narrow the focus to deal only with the 
category of deliberate disinformation; we argue that the crisis is system-wide, leading to a 
range of problems including misinformation, disinformation and mal-information.5
In this report we are concerned with these three kinds of information, some of which are 
referred to as ‘fake news’. Misinformation, as defined in a 2017 Council of Europe report, is 
information that is false, but not created with the intention of causing harm; disinformation 
is information that is false and deliberately created to cause harm; and mal-information 
occurs when information based on reality is used to inflict harm, often by moving information 
designed to stay private into the public sphere.6 Our principal aim is to set out why a response 
is urgently needed to ensure that the systemic changes giving rise to growth in these kinds of 
information do not lead to a weakening of democracy in the UK.
Four basic assumptions underpin this report:
First, this report is pragmatic about truth. It rejects the claim that ‘news’ must ultimately be 
based on universal a priori truth claims. However, we also reject the relativist claim that all 
claims to truth must be abandoned in a post-truth age. Facts and truths are agreed through 
social processes, and the declining reliability and quality of news information is a societal 
challenge that must be confronted systemically.7
Second, the media are ‘environmental’ and should be understood as a whole system.8 They 
are ubiquitous and vital for the conduct of modern life. The development of our information 
environment should not be left wholly to the forces of the marketplace or technological 
innovation, because this environment must be responsive to the commitments and needs of 
citizens within a healthy democracy. It must be resilient to external and internal threats. 
Third, while there are other contributory factors to the problems of fear, mistrust and 
fragmentation (such as the economic crisis and global change), media system change is an 
independent factor and a significant one. 
Disinformation 
is false information 
that is deliberately 
created to cause 
harm.
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8Fourth, the truth and trust effects of our overall media system are a legitimate object of 
policy. It is clear by now that foreign actors have exploited system vulnerabilities. However, 
overall information quality and trust are functions of the resilience of our public media and 
communications infrastructure, not merely an effect of individual decisions to manipulate, 
mislead or distort.9 Policy responses are not without risk and interventions may have 
negative side-effects. Interventions involve making assessments and compromises and their 
outcomes are always subject to complex human behavioural and social reactions. 
A coherent, strategic approach that supports flexible policies that can be adapted over time 
is needed. In this period of heightened disruption and continued innovation, ensuring that 
evidence is available to support informed policy-making is crucial to achieving a workable 
agreement on the purpose and goals of policy interventions. 
Our policy response to the information crisis is set out in Section 5 of this report. Our 
conclusion is that multiple actions are urgently needed to protect the interests of individual 
citizens, to safeguard democracy in the UK and, crucially, to achieve a basis for forging a new 
settlement among all those with a stake in the information environment. Any settlement must 
be flexible enough to accommodate disparate interests and the need for change over time, 
and it must put the interests of citizens at its core. 
Media change 
and its consequences2
The UK has undergone a media revolution in a single generation. In the UK, 
90% of adults say they are recent internet users, with only 8% reporting 
in 2018 that they have never used the internet. Ofcom data show that 
surveyed users (16 years and older) use the internet for an increasingly 
wide range of purposes.
Users vary significantly in whether they check the accuracy of information and are aware 
of where it originates.10 Online platforms are where an increasing proportion of UK citizens 
discover news,11 and in a hybrid media environment,12 citizens are getting information from, and 
engaging in discussion on, social media platforms as well as using traditional news sources.13
The UK media system has become more complex and, arguably, more unstable. There is no 
steady state, or even a uniform trend: for example, after years of growth, news consumption 
via Facebook is falling in the US and the UK, while WhatsApp and Instagram (also owned by 
Facebook) are becoming more important as gateways to news.14 Structural shifts in media 
markets are also taking place: some may be cyclical or short term, but others have longer-
term significance. Social media overall are growing in importance as a space for information 
and debate. 
This is the context and background to widespread fear that ‘fake news’, ‘misinformation’ 
and ‘disinformation’ are unpicking the fabric of society. Clearly, other economic, social and 
political changes contribute to the information crisis,15 but media change, and the information 
crisis, are independent factors. There is huge uncertainty about the scale of the problem, but 
misinformation and disinformation appear to be growing in volume. They are adapting to new 
controls and their impacts are having immediate, as well as structural, consequences. In the 
UK and elsewhere, systemic change in the media system as a whole, including the new digital 
technology companies, is a significant contributing factor. Society has reached a critical 
juncture; an information crisis.
One historic example of a comparable systemic response to a significant social problem 
threatening the stability of the UK is the Beveridge Report of 1942, which helped to lay the 
foundations for the British post-war welfare state. William Beveridge identified the five giant 
evils of social policy and emphasised the urgent need for a coordinated response to abolish 
want. The information crisis is presenting the UK (and other countries) with a similarly 
trenchant set of problems. Following Beveridge, we locate the information crisis in five giant 
evils when we set out the problems confronting governments, parliaments, the technology 
companies and all the participants in the media system of the 21st century.16 
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CYNICISM
Citizens are losing trust, 
even in trustworthy 
sources. 
The Five Giant Evils 
of the information crisis
1
CONFUSION
 Citizens are less sure about 
what is true, and who 
to believe.
3
FRAGMENTATION
Citizens have access to potentially 
infinite knowledge, but the pool of 
agreed facts on which to base societal 
choices is diminishing. Citizens are 
becoming more divided into ‘truth 
publics’ with parallel realities 
and narratives. 
4
IRRESPONSIBILITY
Power over meaning is held by 
organisations that lack a developed 
ethical code of responsibility 
and exist outside of clear 
lines of accountability and 
transparency.
5
APATHY
As a result, citizens disengage 
from established structures of 
society and are losing faith 
in democracy.
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There is increasingly strong evidence in support of our claim that the five evils – confusion, 
cynicism, fragmentation, irresponsibility and apathy – must be addressed through a systemic 
and robust response. This is because, in combination, these ‘evils’ are a threat to individual 
decision-making, national security and democratic government.
The first evil linked to these changes, confusion, means that citizens and others living in 
a particular place are less sure about what is true and who to believe. Confusion is being 
generated by rapid media change, bringing a super abundance of sources available on a 
plurality of platforms that can leave individuals disoriented. That confusion is increased by 
‘information pollution at a global scale’, as the Council of Europe’s report on Information 
Disorder put it in 2017.17 It is created by an advertising model that hard-wires the continuous 
targeting of hyper-partisan views that play into people’s fears and prejudices.18 The apparent 
result is a media system that is optimised for any kind of resonance, rather than for truth. This 
harms democracy when confusion is generated by a high volume of deliberate misinformation 
around contentious political issues or events such as an election.19
The second evil, cynicism, means that citizens are losing trust, even in trustworthy sources. 
This is a global trend. In the US, survey results indicate that the average American viewed at 
least one fake news story in the months leading up to the 2016 election, with more than 50% 
of those respondents reporting that they believed the fake news stories.20 In Europe, evidence 
from a large-scale survey indicates that ‘younger adults – those under 30 – are less trusting 
of the news media and less likely to think the news media are doing a good job in their key 
responsibilities.’21 Cynicism is amplified by the deliberate exploitation of system vulnerabilities 
through information warfare and the spread of false information, destabilising public 
confidence and fomenting social antagonism.22
The third evil, fragmentation, means that although citizens have access to potentially 
infinite information, the pool of agreed facts on which to base societal choices is 
diminishing. There is evidence that citizens are becoming more divided into ‘truth publics’ 
with parallel realities and narratives online.23 Yet the most enthusiastic users of social 
media have been shown to have a wider range of information sources than people who 
rarely go online.24 Although the causes and effects of any fragmentation is an evolving 
debate, media is still a significant independent factor in the quality of political discourse. 
Therefore, it is crucial to address how policy can respond to the challenges to democracy, 
especially with the shift of journalism and public interaction to encrypted channels such as 
WhatsApp and private channels such as Snapchat.25
The fourth evil, irresponsibility, arises because power over meaning is held by organisations 
that lack a developed ethical code of responsibility and that exist outside clear lines of 
accountability and transparency. This has led a situation to emerge whereby, for example, 
Russian social media bots have been able to amplify false information on platforms that 
have not prevented them doing so. The use of the platforms is amplifying the reach of 
misinformation in multiple areas beyond politics. In the health sector, this can have serious 
consequences for individuals. The absence of transparent standards for moderating content 
and signposting quality can mean the undermining of confidence in medical authorities and 
declining public trust in science and research. This has been visible in anti-vaccination 
campaigns when Google search was found to be promoting anti-vaccine misinformation.26 
All over Europe, the anti-vaccination movement, informed via social media, is leading to a 
More	than	50%	of	
Americans who 
saw fake news 
stories around 
the	2016	election	
reported that they 
believed them.
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measurable decline in the rate of vaccination. From health policy and epidemiology to military 
intelligence, there is alarm about the problems of misinformation, but there is no agreement 
on where responsibility lies.
The fifth evil, apathy, whereby citizens disengage from society and begin to lose faith in 
democracy, is part of a longer-term trend and is harder to pin down with evidence.27 A Reuters 
Institute digital news report suggests that in the UK there is declining trust in social media 
information sources and that people are not confident that government or the technology 
companies will act in the public interest.28 Allegations of direct attempts at ‘voter suppression’ 
through concerted campaigns to fragment debate and fuel mistrust in all candidates were 
reported after the 2016 US elections. A well-established tactic of information warfare is to sap 
morale by continuous attrition through the propagation of misinformation.
Events such as the election of Donald Trump, the vote by the UK to leave the EU and the 
rise of populism across Europe and beyond cannot be solely attributed to the design of our 
information systems and the business models in use by the technology companies and by the 
journalism profession.29 That would be to ignore wider economic, social and political causes. 
Regional economic inequalities, for example, may have had a greater influence on people 
voting for Brexit than Russian propaganda bots.30
Inequality, migration, globalisation and ecological risk are creating immense political 
turbulence. They constitute the great challenges facing democratic government for the next 
century. We must ensure that the infrastructure of deliberation – and that means the news 
media and digital information systems – are up to the task of generating informed dialogue 
on social justice in a complex world. Reliable information is vital if the public is to understand 
and relate to these material and political trends and trust the experts involved in generating 
detailed responses to them. Without information 
for understanding the world, citizenship is an 
empty idea and democratic government is 
impossible. 
As the EU’s High Level Expert Group on Fake News 
and Online Disinformation concluded:
Problems of disinformation are deeply 
intertwined with the development of digital 
media. They are driven by actors – state or 
non-state	political	actors,	for-profit	actors,	
media, citizens, individually or in groups – 
and by manipulative uses of communication 
infrastructures that have been harnessed to produce, circulate and amplify disinformation 
on a larger scale than previously, often in new ways that are still poorly mapped and 
understood.31
This is not just, or even primarily, about politics. The public health, emergency management 
and national security implications of a rapid decline in trust in information are arguably of 
greater importance than choices between political parties. And given the role of news in 
economic life, particularly during crises and panics,32 it is highly likely that those seeking to 
exploit system vulnerabilities will be well aware of the potential of misinformation to wreak 
economic havoc. 
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This is not the time for a moral panic.33 True, disruptive media technologies have always 
created utopian expectations and dystopian fears. Radio was once hailed as promising world 
peace.34 Mass television was said to be creating an infantilised and passive public.35 The 
internet was hailed as promising greater democracy – and also a Bladerunner dystopia.36 But 
several decades on it is clear that given the disruption and gravity of the information crisis, 
it is time to take it seriously as a public policy problem. We urgently require the institutional 
capacity to act, and to take a long-term view of smart interventions to monitor and minimise 
the negative impacts of the information crisis.
We argue, in summary, that the information crisis is real. Public policy should approach it as a 
problem of system resilience. Western liberal democracies face many long-term challenges: 
fragilities in our political and electoral system; changes in the economy as it passes through 
austerity and structural change; ecological, social and demographic changes and problems of 
adapting the welfare state; and the relationship of UK citizens and communities to the regional 
and international forces of immigration, inequality and crises in international governance. 
These difficult challenges have triggered simple populist responses, in part because the 
new media system favours the simplicity and emotionality of those responses. 
Negotiating these challenges will test the UK model of deliberative government 
to the limit.
13
There is strong evidence for 
the positive role that good 
quality and reliable news 
plays in society.
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The institutions – public and private – involved in the media system have 
not failed to respond (see Appendix 2 for a brief summary of selected 
recent initiatives).37 In fact, the information crisis has been met by a 
bewildering array of initiatives and reforms, from industry, civil society 
and government. The process of law reform has begun, and the challenges 
of reform are becoming clear. The aim of this section is to unpack and 
analyse the range of stakeholder and government responses that are 
under way. 
In Section 4, we delineate the limitations of the policy interventions outlined here, before 
making recommendations on the basis of this discussion in Section 5.
3.1 The response of the news media: Quality, sustainability, 
‘credibility signalling’ and distribution
The response of the news media has been to: 
■■ Improve the quality of news
■■ Self-regulate to promote traditional journalism verification and ethics
■■ Improve ‘assessability’ of news through credibility signalling
■■ Generate innovative new funding models.
There is strong evidence for the positive role that good quality and reliable news plays in 
society. A decline in the capacity of local news provision, for instance, has been shown to have 
a measurable negative consequence for the financial efficiency of local government.38 But 
attempts to support quality news that do not recognise the complex interactions between the 
media and other societal forces are likely to have limited or even perverse effects. Promoting 
fact-checking, for example, without understanding scepticism about information authority, 
can backfire if the misinformed dig deeper into the trenches of misconceived views as a 
reaction to corrections to information published online.39 A more multifaceted approach to the 
complex ecology of news and information is required.
News media have responded to the crisis with an urgency born of their will to survive. They 
are trying to improve quality and trust in their products and to access better distribution and 
a bigger share of digital revenue. They are experimenting with new business models such as 
subscription or foundation funding and new forms of horizontal collaboration, and they are 
developing new approaches to ‘credibility signalling’ – building trust in their news through 
various forms of trust mark.
For many news organisations, a first step in response to the information crisis is the attempt 
to improve quality. Mainstream news media organisations are becoming aware that to 
Analysis of the 
response so far3
A	first	step	to	
respond to the 
information crisis 
for many news 
organisations is the 
attempt to improve 
quality.
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distinguish themselves from misinformation or poor-quality content, they must improve 
their own standards across the board. Not only are many of them attempting to improve the 
reliability of their own product by tightening journalism standards, but they are also investing in 
internal fact-checking and collaborating with external fact-checkers. 
News media are investing in what philosopher Onora O’Neill calls ‘assessability’40, giving 
media users more contextual information about how to assess the trustworthiness of their 
media. Credibility signalling allows news providers to show the public where they are investing 
in accountability, ethics, verification and higher standards. By showing sources, for example, 
journalists can demonstrate the painstaking research behind a story. The presence or absence 
of shown sources allows citizens to make more informed judgements about quality. This 
is a ‘basic hygiene’ issue for newsrooms, yet it has so far been carried out ad hoc. A range 
of research tools has been launched from organisations such as the Trust Project41 and 
Newsguard42. Some of these are ‘pop-ups’ that reveal sources when a text is browsed. When 
sources need to be protected, that, too, can be explained. Other measures involve editorial 
practices such as allowing comments or feedback, explaining editorial policies on quotes or 
distinguishing between news and comment.43 Some involve good ethical practice such as the 
clear labelling of ‘sponsored’ content. All these contributions are useful and it is possible to 
make media users more aware of these accountability frameworks.44
News providers are continuing to innovate their revenue model and changes, such as 
charitable status, and the associated tax breaks and philanthropic funding, may offer some 
support. However, external funding can also foster a dependency culture and such funders 
often have institutional or ideological agendas that can compromise editorial independence. 
But as part of a mix, and when targeted carefully at specific gaps or used for catalytic projects 
that stimulate best practice and product or service development, such funding can help 
to build capacity for quality news production. At a time of radical restructuring in the news 
industry because of financial pressures, external funding could also encourage much-needed 
diversity to address under-served and specialist audiences.45 A Carnegie UK Trust report 
notes that mandatory local authority notices in newspapers provided a ‘subsidy’ of around 
£40–60 million a year in the UK, but this is now threatened.46 The increasing burden on local 
authorities suggests that other sources of funding will need to be found, for example, via an 
allocation from the Big Lottery Fund. Even if new sources of quality news can be financed, 
distribution is a core challenge and the quality news media continue to face an uphill struggle 
in bringing their product to larger audiences.47
The big challenge on the new platforms is monetisation. The news providers need to gain 
access to better data resources and more advertising revenue if they are to continue. 
Mainstream news organisations are seeking ways to become less reliant on the platforms 
to sustain their business models,48 but they face the threat of media ‘infrastructure capture’ 
by the platforms.49 One strategy is for news publishers to build autonomous routes to the 
public. However, journalism cannot exist in isolated, subscription-supported pockets when 
the public is spending increasing time and attention on the platforms; it needs to go where the 
conversations are happening.50 
In summary, the news media face multiple challenges as they attempt to address the 
information crisis. They are attempting to build quality products and trust, but they face 
huge challenges of distribution and funding. They are innovating and responding, but they 
need help. 
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3.2 The response of the platforms: New partnerships for filtering, 
blocking and moderation
The platforms have been widely criticised and are often held responsible for each of the five 
giant evils of the information crisis. There are various reasons for this. 
The dominance of Google and Facebook in the advertising market means they are price 
setters, and this results in declining advertising revenue for publishers. Publishers argue 
that they are not receiving a fair or sustainable share of advertising revenues related to their 
content when it is aggregated by the platforms or hosted on their sites.51 In the UK, news 
publishers have legacy structures for reaching the public such as direct broadcasting or 
newspaper sales. But Apple, Google (and YouTube), Facebook (and Instagram and WhatsApp) 
and others, including Twitter, Reddit and Snapchat, are in a strong position to shape the 
production and distribution of news. Ofcom survey data indicate that in the UK, TV is the most 
used news platform (79%), with the internet being the next most used overall by all age groups 
(64%), and by 82% of those aged 16-24.52
Technology companies play a core role in the information infrastructure of the UK. The UK public 
sphere is now dependent on the digital services provided by these huge, private sector US-
based companies.53 It can no longer be asserted that the information services provided by such 
technology companies are merely conduits for information. They are curators of information 
through the design of their platforms and through the operation of content moderation 
systems. These systems have significant influence over what users can post (length of texts, 
images, comments), the duration of posted information, and to whom content is pushed using 
algorithms that target, downgrade or influence how people interact with information. These 
companies are making decisions about what content is allowed, what prominence it is given, 
and what revenue goes to content producers such as news organisations.54 An understanding 
of their terms and conditions, operating procedures and principles is crucial to achieving an 
information environment that is consistent with the public interest. 
3.2.1 Platform approaches to content moderation and curation
Social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter have been drawn into the 
debate about the information crisis as their role in the dissemination of information grows and 
is more widely understood. The platforms have responded by:
■■ Developing new approaches to ‘community guidelines’ and terms of service – their 
voluntary standards
■■ Collaborating with fact-checking and other external organisations to provide trust marks 
for quality content and warnings about suspect posts
■■ Opening up their moderation function to some limited transparency and oversight
■■ Collaborating with researchers on targeted projects
■■ Altering the ‘relevance algorithms’ that recommend, surface and suppress content to users
■■ Offering other distribution and prominence benefits to content considered trustworthy.
17
The platforms’ responses include updating their self-regulatory community guidelines and 
terms of service to set rules through contracts with their users. They have invested to scale 
up and automate content moderation. They have partnered with fact-checkers and others 
to flag, tag and filter news for quality control. In response to criticism of the ‘privatised 
censorship’ that this has led to,55 they have developed a number of measures to improve 
the transparency and accountability of their editorial function. They have introduced new 
forms of collaboration and support for journalism, including through funding, and they have 
developed research partnerships to offer controlled access to their data. Yet, moderation 
should mean more than mitigating harm; it must include a responsibility to curate for 
transparency and in the public interest.56
As the platforms review their moderation and content curation policies and practices in 
response to public scrutiny, the changes they introduce often have unintended consequences, 
especially because they exert limited pre-emptive control over what happens on their 
networks.57 They are subject to criticism because their mission statements often provide an 
inadequately transparent framework for their actions,58 and because there is no independent 
mechanism in the UK to hold them to account to ensure they operate in line with normative 
ethical standards of responsibility. As a result, moderation of information and curation of 
content by platforms are happening without enough public input into the principles and 
objectives behind them. This raises concerns about censorship and bias. 
Digital technology companies are incentivised by their business models to favour maximum 
openness and minimal intervention in the posting of information, and to surface information 
that maximises engagement. This increases their revenue from advertisers and other clients. 
By achieving scale through openness, they increase the amount of user data they generate 
and this allows them to expand, and to facilitate personalised or targeted services for users 
and other companies.
Platform companies are more readily accepting that it is in their interest and in the public 
interest for their operations to be more accountable than at present, and potentially subject to 
oversight by external bodies.59 Facebook, for example, has deployed third party fact-checking 
with the aim of demoting false news.60 However, external accountability conflicts with an 
advertising model in which advertising revenue is driven by engagement, which is related to 
the perceived truth of a statement according to user behavioural bias and emotion. These 
factors are key drivers of virality.
The platforms have, through a combination of corporate social responsibility and self-
interest in the face of regulatory threats, begun to support credible journalism to promote an 
alternative to misinformation and harmful content. They have done so by forging an ‘uneasy 
alliance’ with the news publishers.61 Despite these moves, it has been suggested that the 
content aggregators (Apple News, Google News) should provide better deals and facilitate 
subscriptions in order to provide support for credible publishers.62 Publishers are calling for 
greater transparency from the social media and search companies about the data they collect. 
They are also calling for the ability to share data routinely with the platforms, but the platforms 
are in a position to resist such calls.63 
The platforms’ rules for content removal are broader than those of conventional publishers. 
They rely on algorithms and content flagging with human moderation. This means that there 
are mistakes and inconsistencies in this process,64 since flagging and tagging content depend 
on an evaluative process. In many instances, there is a social consensus to make this relatively 
unproblematic (in relation to child abuse standards, for example), but in many other cases 
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relating to hate speech, disinformation and quality journalism, the judgements are non-trivial 
and are subject to frequent dispute.65 News publishers complain about a lack of consultation 
and transparency about the changes the platforms make and in their relationships with content 
providers.66 A range of tools and practices is being deployed to improve credibility signalling 
and the filtering out of malicious or false content.67 However, ad hoc practices operate outside 
effective public oversight and they are controversial – platform companies are accused both of 
over-blocking (with huge consequences for user rights) and of failing to block.68
The platforms are in a difficult, but immensely powerful, position. They are involved in making 
value judgements about whether to block or promote speech – they are the ‘new governors 
of online speech’.69 They are aiming to ensure that their content moderation practices are 
responsive to the expectations of users in different regional and national contexts. They are 
increasing their commitment to moderating content in line with public expectations, and are 
making efforts towards greater transparency,70 while there are ‘flags and tags’ trust marks and 
labelling initiatives in many forms, both positive and negative. Some of these are carried out by 
independent civil society organisations separately from the media.71
The development of social media ethics or a new settlement among all interested parties 
requires a common understanding of what voluntary ethical standards and responsibilities 
should apply on these complex platforms. Until now, individual companies have developed 
their own terms of service and ethical standards, and, to some extent, have differentiated 
their brands partly on this basis: hence the difference between Facebook’s approach to ‘real’ 
identity and content standards and that of Twitter. The consequence of this approach to ethics 
is that consumers and users are left confused about what constitutes acceptable ‘norms’ for 
the quality of information. Overall, the platforms’ responses can be described as piecemeal 
and incremental.72 
In summary, the application of decentralised labelling schemes as a means of signalling 
credibility and the platforms’ content moderation methods involve sensitive judgements 
about what is ‘socially useful’ news. They give rise to charges of bias and censorship and to 
a requirement for independent audit and transparency. There is an urgent need to introduce 
measures that will ensure that the platforms adhere to agreed standards of ethical platform 
responsibility. Clearer lines of responsibility and accountability are essential, and requirements 
for transparency need to be monitored over time.73 
3.2.2 The special case of election communication
One of the reasons that the crisis of misinformation has come to light in recent years is that 
election communication has become one of the core areas of controversy. It has been argued 
that other areas of misinformation – such as health, emergencies, security and the economy 
– may ultimately provide a stronger justification of a new public policy approach, but it is 
because of elections that the issue has become more widely discussed.
The challenges in the electoral arena are created by new ways in which parties are 
campaigning. While data used to target specific groups of voters have always been part of 
political campaigning (for example, gathered through door-to-door canvassing), online data-
intensive approaches greatly increase campaign message targeting capabilities, and these are 
now central to the political communication strategies used by the major UK parties. Facebook 
alone has 40 million registered users in the UK and offers a very effective advertising tool. 
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This is a significant discontinuity with previous models of advertising. Political advertising on 
television is banned in the UK, but there is no restriction on digital platform advertising, and the 
major political parties are spending heavily on these platforms.74
Social media advertising is also hard to regulate because it not only involves registered 
political parties, but also other potential participants such as political consultancies and non-
party campaigning organisations.75 Advertising can also be purchased by external actors, 
including foreign governments, with the aim of increasing polarisation and generating mistrust 
in institutions. 
While Facebook has increased its monitoring and identification of political advertising to 
enforce its existing guidelines,76 these efforts lack transparency and are no substitute for 
publicly accountable regulation. Regulators themselves have recognised this and have 
argued for increased powers. In 2018, the Electoral Commission called for increased 
transparency on who is paying for online political advertisements, clearer reporting 
requirements on how political parties spend their money and the power to levy larger fines 
on those who break the rules.77 
In the same year, the Information Commissioner’s Office’s report, Democracy Disrupted, said 
there was a ‘significant shortfall in transparency’ and made policy recommendations for 
addressing ‘personal information and political influence’.78 The public has limited awareness of 
how individuals are targeted by political parties. Ofcom evidence suggests that while people 
may be aware that their data are being used to allow third parties to tailor messages to them, 
they know less about the data brokerage systems and involvement of third parties and how 
the data are used or monetised.79
The content of political advertising in the UK remains largely unregulated80 – political 
advertising is not covered by the Advertising Standards Authority’s (ASA) remit, for example.81 
Such a self-regulatory arrangement may no longer be sustainable when social media 
are making paid advertising content a much more important element in the UK’s political 
communication. 
There is, in summary, no guarantee that the next general election or future referendums will 
take place under an updated regulatory framework. Unless action is urgently taken, the UK 
could go back to the polls with a regulatory framework that is as broken as the one that exists 
today. 
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3.3 The response of public authorities
Given these developments and the growing sense of a ‘crisis’, governments, parliaments 
and public authorities in the UK and beyond are responding. Initiatives are fragmented and 
hampered by a high level of political sensitivity, but there is a growing call for a new public 
policy approach to the information crisis. The key main directions of policy involve:
■■ Coordinating and encouraging co-regulation and self-regulation standards for platforms 
and news media. The European Commission has issued a Communication on fake news 
and coordinated the production of a Code of practice on disinformation82
■■ Developing the law to include specific new offences and categories of illegal content and 
introducing procedural changes to the liability structure for content83
■■ Fiscal policy and tax reforms to fund news
■■ Competition interventions under current law
■■ Changes to competition law and ‘structural’ interventions to change the size and shape of 
technology companies, and their behaviour.
Some of these proposals are being implemented; most are at the discussion stage. This 
section examines the policy proposals under consideration, as a reference point for the 
recommendations we make later in Section 5. 
3.3.1 Regulated self-regulation and standard setting 
The government and its agencies have a long track record of loose coordination of self-
regulatory initiatives taken by the platforms and other actors in the media system – the 
partners know that self-regulation must be seen to work or regulation by law will be 
imposed. The EU has a code of conduct on hate speech84 and another Code of practice on 
disinformation, which the platforms have signed up to.85 The latter focuses mainly on paid 
advertising and the structure of the new code is that of an entirely voluntary, self-monitoring 
scheme. The new Audiovisual Media Services Directive was adopted in October 2018 
with provisions that will apply to some social media and video-sharing platforms such as 
YouTube, with codes of conduct that will be audited.86 In the UK, it has been suggested that 
a regulator could act as an auditor of procedural standards (e.g. a minimum of due process 
and transparency) that platforms can meet in fulfilling their obligations to review and take 
down content.87 The suggestion is that these should be overseen and coordinated by an 
independent agency. 
3.3.2 Altering moderation incentives and intermediary liability 
The current arrangements for digital content moderation militate against an ethical ‘good 
Samaritan’ approach by platforms. Since liability protection is granted when platforms are 
unaware of the content on their platforms, they are less likely to seek to monitor and protect. 
For this reason, policy approaches under discussion take the form of altering the incentives 
around moderation.
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There are those who want to claim a priori that Section 230 of the US Communications 
Decency Act (which provides immunity from liability for providers and users of an ‘interactive 
computer service’ who publish information provided by third parties) and Article 14 of the EU 
E-Commerce Directive (providing liability exemptions for hosting third party content) should 
be preserved as a means to protect freedom of expression, but it is not possible to sustain this 
argument indefinitely and independently of context.88 Freedom of expression is not absolute, 
and the proportionality of a change in liability arrangements depends on the actions and 
standards that platforms are able to commit to and effectively implement.89
Many experts now agree that binary distinctions of publisher/non-publisher and liability/
non-liability suggested by the current intermediary liability arrangements (under the EU 
E-commerce Directive and the US Communications Decency Act) should be replaced by a 
hybrid or intermediate category. A service provider occupying this category is not without 
responsibility, but nor should it be held entirely liable for content that it hosts. Intermediaries 
have a range of normative responsibilities that need to be reflected in any new, unique legal 
settlement.90
In a US context, this notion of a settlement has been developed by legal scholars into the 
notion of ‘information fiduciaries’.91 In the UK context, it is suggested that the wider legal 
concept of a ‘duty of care’ offers an intermediate category between strict and no liability.92 
These proposals operate not through contractual relationships with users or strict liability, 
but through a general expectation of ethical behaviour and trust. Since intermediaries are 
themselves not speakers,93 the interest engaged is the right to receive ideas, and there is a 
justification of oversight of the general ethical orientation of the intermediary. These proposals 
are at a very early stage. The key challenge is that they effectively delegate discretion for 
‘ethical’ design to the intermediaries themselves and thus, award them huge power. Any such 
move, therefore, would require new and much stronger constraints of accountability and 
transparency, which is itself challenging in a global perspective.
3.3.3 Fiscal social policy 
Taxation is an opportunity for governments to shape and improve the media system. Changes 
in charitable status – that is, a change to the tax status of news organisations – could have a 
much greater impact than external funding by charities. Currently, tax advantages are spread 
across the newspaper industry. The VAT exemption is worth more than £300 million per year. 
By consolidating and redistributing a tax advantage that applies to a declining revenue stream 
(newspaper sales) to a growing revenue stream (online news), Government could incentivise 
the growth of quality journalism, for example, by offering targeted tax breaks if platforms take 
independently verified measures to facilitate a public service or public information role. 
There are multiple calls for levies and various forms of hypothecated platform taxes. In France 
and Belgium, platforms and publishers have an agreement for a payment rather than a tax. 
The UK Government proposed a ‘digital services tax’ in October 2018.94 The supernormal 
profits of the platforms are seen as being available for creative ways to address the negative 
externalities associated with platforms and to fund a wide range of other social benefits such 
as quality news. Some of these fiscal measures are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Proposed Fiscal Policy Measures
Proposed by: Type of levy: Funding will go to:
UK   
UK Government 2% tax on UK generated revenues of 
large platforms
Treasury (general taxation) 
Campaign for Media Reform95  A levy on digital advertising revenues 
earned by the largest companies
Setting up a networked local news 
wire service
Doteveryone96 Funding from industry through the 
proposed Office for Responsible 
Technology
Protecting the public via public-
facing awareness work and 
supporting people to seek redress 
House of Commons DCMS 
Select Committee97
‘Education’ levy on social media 
companies
Financing a ‘comprehensive 
educational framework’ to make 
digital literacy the 4th  pillar 
of education, and for a public 
awareness initiative
Conservative Party manifesto 
201798 and Internet Safety 
Strategy Green Paper99
Social media levy, voluntary and 
then underpinned by legislation as 
necessary
Promote awareness and online 
safety, contribute to countering 
harms
Labour Party100 Windfall tax on platform profits Public interest media 
News Media Association101 A content licence fee, paid annually 
by tech companies
Independent journalism
EU   
The Copyright Directive –
European Parliament has 
voted in favour with final vote 
due in January 2019
Link tax that aims to ensure that 
content creators are paid when their 
work is used by sharing platforms 
such as YouTube or Facebook, and 
news aggregators such as Google 
News102
Publishers, journalists, artists, 
musicians
FRANCE   
Government and Google 
agreement in 2013103
Google agreed to share ad revenue 
and set up a €60m fund for digital 
journalism innovation
Increased ad revenue for publishers 
who use Google advertising 
products and who apply to the 
innovation fund
BELGIUM   
Publishers and Google 
agreement in 2012104 
Google agreed to share ad revenue Publishers
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The appropriate level and target of a social policy-driven hypothecated tax or levy depends 
on the behavioural outcome that is desired. The parallel with tobacco and alcohol is clear 
in that successive governments have used taxation to price in the social externalities – of 
damage to health, for example – as a consensus emerged about the health effects of 
smoking and drinking. As the ‘ jury is still out’ regarding the potential externalities associated 
with the platforms, and since it is not clear if self-regulation by the platforms can effectively 
deal with them, the tools of policy must be applied through an iterative process. Platforms 
that are found to fail to develop a satisfactory approach to self-regulation, transparency 
or accountability could, for example, be subject to a higher rate of tax. This would raise 
challenges of impartiality and independence and ‘content neutrality’ in the application of tax 
rules, but these are not insurmountable. If the levy is a funding mechanism for public interest 
or quality media, the additional policy challenges of ensuring that funding is independently and 
fairly allocated, and that funded content achieves an audience, need to be addressed. 
3.3.4 Competition regulation and ‘structural’ remedies
It is by now a cliché to call for the ‘tech giants’ to be ‘broken up’. There are, however, few 
detailed policy proposals under consideration regarding just how to do that. One argument 
for such a break-up – or the intermediate stage of structural separation where the businesses 
would be separated into independent units – is that it would provide an opportunity to ensure 
that organisational structures provide incentives to address the information crisis. A lively 
debate is currently raging around the world about structural remedies and the extent to which 
it is possible or desirable to apply them in one country. In many cases, however – including 
in an independent review commissioned by the UK Treasury – the focus is explicitly not on 
the wider social and political implications of platform dominance; it is only on the economic 
aspects.105
Platforms are operated as multi-sided markets that give their operators the power to cross-
subsidise between different sides of the market. Under these conditions, price may not be the 
best proxy for indicating if a market is functioning well and indeed, whether citizen or social 
welfare is being enhanced. It is widely recognised now that a new approach is required.106 This 
applies in terms of the thresholds of permitted dominance (we might want a lower threshold, 
as with the rule adopted on media plurality) and to the kinds of remedies applied. Structural 
solutions in the context of mergers and assessments of market dominance could result in 
behavioural or structural remedies that address specific harms associated with platform 
dominance. This could include governance arrangements that apply to specific harms and 
innovative new forms of structural separation such as separating advertising from editorial 
functions.107 These could incorporate procedural innovations (such as the administration of 
public interest tests) into a merger regime or into considerations of market dominance and 
harms. Examples of proposals for platform structural separation are shown in Table 2.
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These solutions would be complex – although by no means impossible – to implement on 
a nation-by-nation basis, and it is not yet clear which of them are necessary. They should be 
taken seriously as policy options that may be needed, should voluntary measures (many of 
which could have the same institutional effect) not be successful. Questions of separation and 
Chinese walls should – as Jonathan Zittrain suggests – consider misinformation alongside 
the economic competition issues.113
A response to the need for independent oversight of content moderation and to the substantial 
market dominance of a small number of digital platforms can be undertaken in a variety of 
ways, as indicated in this section. There is no single solution to the disruptive effects of the 
burgeoning digital platform market for the traditional news media, for citizens, or for ensuring 
that a sphere for informed public debate is sustained and nurtured. Policy responses to the 
information crisis require ongoing debate, yet there are actions that can be taken now – 
informed by existing evidence – as we recommend later in Section 5. 
3.4 Media literacy: A necessary condition for democracy in a 
digital age
All of the responses in the preceding section are top-down. Publishers, platforms and 
public authorities make assumptions about the role and competencies of actors – their 
level of media literacy and their motivations and interests in repairing the information crisis. 
Historically, these have been wrong assumptions in that they tend to overestimate the extent 
to which citizens are rational and seek truth. The long-term solution must also be bottom-
Table 2: Proposals for platform structural separation
Separation Suggested By Rationale Legal Basis
Unbundle the 
recommendation 
algorithm
‘Facebook needs to hand 
over its algorithm if it really 
wants to end fake news’ 
(Quartz)108
Plurality/user 
empowerment: users 
could choose their own 
bias.
Competition benefits
Would require new 
legislation
Facebook should divest 
WhatsApp, Instagram
Freedom from Facebook,109 
a US-based organisation, 
is calling for the Federal 
Trade Commission to 
break up Facebook, 
WhatsApp, Instagram and 
Messenger110
Competition in ad 
markets/ leverage of 
control in data markets
Competition law
Structural separation of 
editorial and advertising
How to ‘break up’ Facebook 
(LSE)111 
 
Recommendation would 
be ‘dis-incentivised’ from 
fuelling fake news
Would require new 
legislation
Break up Google, 
separating search, 
YouTube, Adsense, etc.
‘Break up Google’, (Boston 
Globe Editorial Board)112 
Market dominance in 
advertising.
Anti-competitive behaviour
Competition law
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up because sceptical, informed and skilled users are integral to an accountable system for 
verifying information. It must be bottom-up because it must rely on citizens’ capacities to 
navigate as both producers and users of online information in a complex environment.
Discussions of the challenging issues dealt with by this Commission often express the hope 
for better media literacy in the general public. After all, democracy requires citizens who are 
empowered, informed, autonomous and able to exist in the freest information environment 
possible. But unfortunately, media literacy initiatives are often short-lasting, narrow in purpose, 
or of uncertain educational value.
3.4.1 Media literacy in education
Resources for media, digital, critical or news literacy are proportionally tiny compared to 
other educational areas. They are implemented in schools and other learning and information 
sites only sporadically, far from comprehensively or inclusively, and without much, if any, 
independent evaluation of their effectiveness.114 Media literacy is a complex and demanding 
topic to teach and learn. It is vital that this is thoroughly embedded in classroom education 
and also that it extends well beyond the classroom to enable civic and political engagement of 
diverse kinds, for adults as well as children.115 
In a crowded curriculum, neither Media Studies nor Citizenship education have been 
prioritised, with the former studied by only a minority and the latter barely finding space in the 
curriculum. Neither receives the cross-curricular attention required, and there are concerns 
about the level and quality of media literacy teaching resources.116 Information literacy is in the 
Citizenship curriculum and that is compulsory, but there is little time for critical digital literacy. 
As a subject, Media Studies has been marginalised and while the Computing curriculum 
tackles some of these issues, this has been given poor reviews by the Royal Society and is, 
again, a crowded, optional topic.117
3.4.2 Media literacy and the general public
There is now a consensus that media literacy should empower citizens to thrive and contribute 
to the democratic contestation of ideas, to act and to participate in the public sphere and in 
relation to public and political life. Citizens need information to participate for social, community 
and political purposes at all levels from local to global, including to share and organise to act 
collaboratively. This requires information, communication tools and inclusive access, plus 
the nurturing of critical skills to weigh information and the communicative skills to contribute 
quality information. One downside of constantly warning about ‘fake news’ is that a more 
general passive cynicism may be instilled in the public.118 Yet there is clear evidence that greater 
education for media literacy has a direct impact on improving people’s ability to access119 
and judge120 information. With growing evidence of the damage in which misinformation and 
disinformation are involved, a new and increased commitment to media literacy is needed that 
addresses the context as well as the symptoms121 – a media literacy that is fit for confronting 
the informational complexities that face citizens of the early 21st century.
Citizens have a responsibility not to misinform just as they have social duties to avoid causing 
harm in other areas of life. There are practical things that individuals can do to identify and 
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counter misinformation.122 However, they need to be given the tools, knowledge and incentives to 
do so.123 Instead of only focusing on ‘stopping’ misinformation through technology or regulation, 
media policy also needs to develop policies that build structures and capacity for individuals to 
act. Finally, media literacy needs to be understood as a long-term benefit rather than a short-term 
solution, and judged accordingly when resources are allocated and policy decisions are made 
about regulation.124
One problem faced by citizens is complexity and uncertainty: an over-abundance of information, a 
diversification of sources, and a sense of not knowing what to trust because every source takes a 
position and there is not enough time to spend on verifying or decoding it.125 News organisations 
and the platforms build their production models on the premise that people are time-poor, yet 
editorial techniques that are designed to gain attention in an efficient way may sometimes mean 
compromises on transparency and context. Citizens have many other priorities in their often 
time-constrained lives, so it is asking too much to expect them to take responsibility for ensuring 
the credibility and quality of their media consumption, let alone its diversity.126
Media literacy levels as measured by Ofcom fluctuate over time, and there is little evidence of 
steady improvement. The Commission on Fake News and the teaching of critical literacy skills 
in schools report from the National Literacy Trust found that only 2% of primary and secondary 
age children have the critical literacy skills they need to tell if a news story is real or fake.127 
Similarly, Ofcom has found confusion among adults about how their data are being used, the 
funding of search engines and the role of advertising and regulation in general.128 Inequalities in 
understanding clearly exist,129 and as technologies develop, the challenge continues apace. Basic 
literacy can be measured, but in relation to news and information, critical thinking – the ability to 
interrogate as well as comprehend information – is especially vital, and this is more difficult to 
measure and track. However, it seems clear that with the demands on people’s media literacy 
constantly outpacing what they can understand or keep up with, the media literacy gap will 
continue to grow unless substantial efforts are made.130 People need to be able to frame good 
questions as well as to find answers, and they need to feel that they care about and can rely on 
what they consume.131 132 
Mainstream news media have tended to avoid explaining themselves in the past. Now the 
same tools that allow for audience engagement and interactivity also offer ways to improve 
understanding of how journalism is produced and who produces it, for example, by citing 
sources and allowing user feedback. Media literacy offers a route to building journalism credibility 
and trust through greater transparency. News organisations such as De Correspondent, The 
Guardian133 and Bristol Cable have made media literacy activities and practice integral to their 
audience relationships and community building. Mainstream commercial newsrooms such as 
The Times and The Financial Times now include more offline as well as online audience access to 
journalists and the news-making process. The BBC, The Guardian (Guardian Foundation) and The 
Times have helped build media literacy courses for schools.134
In summary, media literacy is a necessary part of the answer, but investment in media literacy is 
paltry and often wasted when it is not part of a joined-up, strategic, long-term approach. Media 
literacy messages need to be based on a reliable set of principles that are understood by news 
providers, educators and platforms, and they need to be implemented effectively and consistently 
over time in an unstable world. The public needs and deserves to have better information, and 
better ways of sharing information about who and what to trust, and why.
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There is an urgent need 
for action that will yield 
greater transparency and 
accountability.
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Limitations of 
responses so far4
The urgent requirement of any new settlement for the digital information 
environment is independent assessment and action to underpin policy and 
public debate about how the news media, campaigners and the platforms 
are shaping the conditions for public deliberation, which is essential to 
democracy.135
The platform companies can be a powerful force in enabling access to topical information and 
for citizen mobilisation and debate136, but what is expected of them needs to be clear and it 
must be aligned with the public interest.
The policy interventions discussed in Section 3 are not mutually exclusive options. They 
represent the toolkit available to policy-makers who are seeking to mitigate the negative 
social impacts and harms associated with digital content and the wider issues involved in the 
information crisis, exacerbated by the transformations in Western media systems.
The range of stakeholder and policy responses to the information crisis is impressive: in the 
past three to five years a growing number of interventions has attempted to mitigate the 
growing confusion, cynicism, fragmentation, ignorance and apathy – the five evils – that 
are the symptoms of the information crisis. With time, these initiatives may bear fruit. The 
first phase in rolling out a framework for intervention to strengthen the resilience of the UK 
media system is a debate with the platforms about what baseline standards we expect their 
performance to meet. This process has begun – with the production of the Santa Clara 
Principles on Transparency and Content Moderation, for example.137 Whatever the eventual 
mix of solutions that is applied, a step-change is needed now to ensure that future policy and 
regulatory decisions are effective and are based on the optimal evidence.
Despite these efforts, progress is likely to be slow and halting, for several reasons.
4.1 Coordination problems
Voluntary self-regulatory responses often require coordination between companies vertically 
along the value chain and horizontally between competing firms. Many of these companies are 
involved in zero-sum competition for market share and revenue, and collaboration is structurally 
difficult. It is difficult to imagine decisions taken with altruistic, public interest benefits as an 
objective, unless a wider framework of credible rules and incentives is established. There are 
multiple potential pitfalls. For example, platforms may use various forms of trust-marking and 
tagging to exclude content of competitors or impose contractual terms to the disadvantage of 
content providers. It is well established that such forms of self-regulation can raise barriers to 
market entry and reduce the overall level of competition in the market.138 
Relying on pure market incentives and ‘enlightened self-interest’ through self-regulation is 
unlikely to be an effective way to raise quality and ensure trust. There are also certain content 
producers that might benefit from a wider trust deficit in the market: for example, purveyors of 
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quality, reliable news to ‘elite groups’ that are willing to pay subscriptions. It is unlikely that the 
optimum level of information for market participants will be provided without some form of 
intervention. This has been the case in other markets: for example, targeted interventions have 
been used in the regulation of advertising of broadband speeds, auditing of price comparison 
sites and other consumer transparency initiatives.139
Policy interventions that involve distribution of new funding from general taxation, from 
a hypothecated tax, or from specific levies on platforms, also raise questions about the 
mechanism and criteria for distribution.140 It is essential that the policy principles for 
distribution of funds are not administered in a short-term way to placate powerful interests, as 
some would argue is the case with regard to some of the funding initiatives. These initiatives 
must be based on a proper strategic review of the long-term needs to provide independence 
and resilience for media systems and to enhance the news producers’ capabilities to serve 
public information needs. 
There are also wider coordination problems that relate to whether standards and expectations 
should be industry-wide, generic rules of conduct, or whether conduct expectations should 
vary by platform or by jurisdiction. Radically different futures are imaginable. In one, each 
society will generate new norms of behaviour and practices of ethical restraint that apply to all 
digital platforms. In another, users will generate different expectations as regards ethics, trust 
and security on different commercial services. Such scenarios will be in tension. The time has 
come to ensure that society-wide baseline standards are in place that apply to all services, and 
to encourage the development of ‘competition for quality’ through brand-driven approaches 
above those standards. There is a need for the independence of institutions and processes 
to clarify for citizens what their reasonable expectations should be with regard to content 
standards and moderation, and about the way incentives in the market for platforms operate.
4.2 Insufficient evidence, research and evaluation
There is a broad consensus that there is an information crisis, but opinion on the depth, 
extent and detailed manifestation of this crisis is divided. It is essential that in the short- to 
medium-term, policy responses are guided by the best possible available evidence. In policy 
discussions to date, however, it is clear that there is an evidence and research deficit that 
undermines evidence-based policy-making in this area.141 
The irony is that attempts to respond to the crisis of truth and trust have themselves been 
impeded by their own crisis of truth and trust. There is a paucity of reliable data on what 
is happening on the platforms and a methodological challenge in analysing what data are 
available. The academic community currently lacks access to the data held by platforms 
that is essential for research that can hold them to account.142 Facebook has initiated 
a project to allow academics to use its data under conditions intended to protect user 
privacy,143 but it is unclear how responsive this will be to researcher data requirements. This 
development is welcome, but since Facebook is not the only platform, this is only a partial 
response to the problem.
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Given the lack of accessible data for research, evidence-based policy-making is difficult. There 
have been investigations into the causes and consequences of the information crisis, but 
these have been mostly in the US.144 In the UK there are ongoing inquiries. The Department for 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport commissioned research for its inquiry into the sustainability 
of the UK newspaper industry,145 and the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism’s 
Digital news report provides a detailed annual survey of consumer behaviour.146 Newsrooms 
have more data than ever before about their users, but these data are used to measure 
consumption, not to address broader issues. Evidence, underpinned by independent research, 
is crucial to examine biases in the platforms’ technical and human operations.147 Work is 
needed to monitor the impact of codes of conduct and the impacts of changes in legislation 
and in technology. 
4.3 Regulatory capture, conflicts of interest and protecting freedom 
of expression
Stakeholders often have self-interested reasons to respond to the information crisis in 
different ways. News publishers seek to impose regulatory burdens on those competing with 
them for advertising revenue. Platforms seek to minimise regulatory burdens and secure 
control of more data resources. Certain political actors and interests directly benefit from 
the atmosphere of confusion and mistrust and seek to perpetuate it. There is also a constant 
danger that reforms are a threat to freedom of expression – or appear to be.
It is democracy overall that suffers. The multiple vested interests at work are unlikely to 
resolve a misinformation crisis rooted in structural and systemic issues that date back 
decades. The long history of policy-making in relation to newspapers illustrates the dangers 
and difficulties that reside in constitutional relationships between media institutions and the 
wider democratic polity. Unpacking the difficult institutional relationships between powerful 
media corporations, platforms and other intermediaries inevitably is a delicate and politically 
sensitive area.
As previous debate around the regulation of newspapers has shown, media policy-making 
must balance standard setting with protecting freedoms.148 The Editorial Code accepted by 
some UK newspapers gives them a duty to take care not to publish inaccurate stories.149 If it 
were to be decided that platforms should be held to the same standard, there may be a risk 
of a ‘slippery slope’ towards restricting freedom of expression. The platforms’ norms do not 
reflect traditional editorial codes – as, for example, when Facebook maintains that in the 
interests of free expression it allows people to make ‘non-factual’ statements such as ‘the 
earth is flat’.150 While the analogy with newspapers is limited by the fact that social media 
combine complex new editorial, curation and distribution roles, the question of principle 
remains the same: how to incentivise a more reliable information environment for citizens 
without compromising freedom of expression or limiting the many positive benefits the new 
internet intermediaries bring to citizens and society. 
31
The key challenge is to foster accountability while preserving the right to freedom of 
expression – even when the views are challenging, radical, and are offensive to some – in 
the face of pressure to protect the public from disinformation and the promotion of hatred or 
harm. It is important to note that under the relevant international laws this includes the right to 
receive information, and also concerns the positive obligation on governments to protect free 
expression, including from the actions of private actors.151
This challenge requires initiatives on the part of existing institutions, but it must be 
accomplished with independent oversight, whatever the balance among competing values 
that is deemed appropriate in the UK. Transparency, and civil society involvement and 
oversight by Parliament and institutions at the highest level, are therefore not mere slogans 
to which lip service must be paid: they are crucial to the success of problem-solving efforts. 
It is not enough to reject the task of building in greater accountability because of its potential 
to undermine freedom of expression. The values underlying freedom of expression and, in 
particular, the search for truth, democratic government and the value of human autonomy, 
must be reflected in a new settlement. 
As a result of these challenges and weaknesses, even the most well intended and well 
resourced of interventions by single actors are likely to fail, or at least to take years to bed in. 
There is a need for a strategic intervention to resolve some of the coordination problems and 
conflicts of interest and to provide resources to encourage each of the stakeholders in their 
initiatives. Section 5 sets out our recommendations for such a strategic intervention.
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We call for the 
establishment of a new 
Independent Platform 
Agency (IPA)
Towards a new policy framework: 
Principles and Values 5
Responding to the challenges that we have set out in this report is no 
easy task. Before setting out a series of immediate and longer-term 
recommendations, it is important to establish some principles and values 
that must underpin how interventions in this area should be designed.
5.1 Principles for policy reform
■■ Freedom of expression: The right to impart and receive ideas without interference should 
be preserved. Restrictions should be proportionate, legitimate and prescribed by law.
■■ Subsidiarity: Decisions about content standards should be taken as close as possible to 
those that are affected. This will often mean at a national level.
■■ Transparency: Decisions about filtering, promotion and takedown of content can be 
censorship, and can undermine trust. They should be taken according to well-known 
principles and reported publicly.
■■ Evidence: Access to improved data for regulators and the public is fundamental.
■■ Civil society should be involved in reforms of co-regulation and self-regulation. This may 
mean providing resources for organisations to be involved.
■■ Ongoing review: The process of reform will be an iterative process and the potential 
outcome (on a continuum from self-regulation, to regulation to break-up of dominant 
companies) is not clear at the outset.
■■ Independence: The new IPA should be structurally independent from government, 
including in its appointments and finances.
5.2 Recommendations of the LSE Truth, Trust and 
Technology Commission
Given the challenges facing Western democracies, and the difficulties we face transitioning to 
a new news and information system, public policy must support existing initiatives in smart, 
flexible ways. It must provide legislative support where necessary, and give any innovation that 
increases the resilience of the media system the greatest possible chance of success. 
We argue for an approach with a long-term horizon that runs with the grain of existing 
initiatives by news media, by publishers and other stakeholders, but which provides for 
the capacity to evaluate where their limitations are likely to be found. In contrast to almost 
all of the attempts to develop new policy in this area, we take a systemic approach to the 
information crisis problem and propose a set of short-, medium- and long-term solutions.
It is essential that the dominant platforms are involved in negotiating the new policy 
settlement with regard to their duties and the standards of performance they are expected to 
achieve. We divide our recommendations into three groups: immediate action and short-term 
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measures that should be implemented as soon as possible by government; medium-term 
actions that are likely to take somewhat longer to put in place, but that are equally essential 
for the health of the UK information environment; and longer-term actions that are conditional 
upon the outcome of actions in the short and medium term.
5.2.1 Recommendations for immediate action 
Establish an Independent Platform Agency (IPA)
The UK and devolved governments should introduce a new levy on UK social media 
and search advertising revenue, a proportion of which would be ring-fenced to fund a 
new Independent Platform Agency (IPA). The IPA should be structurally independent of 
government but report to Parliament. Its purpose, initially, will be not direct regulation, but 
rather an ‘observatory and policy advice’ function, and a permanent institutional presence 
to encourage the various initiatives attempting to address problems of information.
We call for the establishment of a new Independent Platform Agency (IPA) that cannot be 
done without the introduction of a targeted digital platform levy. Government and Parliament 
should introduce the ring-fenced platform levy to fund the IPA to monitor and evaluate 
the effectiveness of platform self-regulation and the development of quality news and 
journalism. The exact parameters of the IPA’s role will be subject to discussion and should be 
adaptable over time. The basic principles on which the IPA should be established must be: (a) 
independence, that is, formal independence from Government, mainstream media and from 
platform companies, but with representation of each stakeholder type within its governance 
structure; and (b) the specific power and authority, underwritten by statue, to make ongoing 
recommendations to Government regarding the contribution platforms make to the UK’s 
news environment and, in particular, the measures required of all relevant stakeholders to 
sustain its health, including, but not limited to, platforms. The IPA’s core role will be to monitor 
whether all relevant parties are fulfilling their responsibilities to ensure that the UK information 
environment is one in which citizens can contribute to democracy effectively, and making 
policy recommendations to address problems that arise.
The levy on platforms should be sufficient to establish and support the IPA – annually, in the 
order of £40–50 million.152 The proceeds from the levy should be available to the IPA and used 
in support of its oversight, investigation and reporting function. The Government announced 
a 2% tax on online sales in its October 2018 budget, but the proceeds raised are not expressly 
targeted to measures to address the information crisis. Our recommendation is for a levy on 
those technology companies that function as platforms for news and that are assessed by 
Ofcom in its annual surveys as being the platforms that are used above an agreed threshold 
by UK citizens to source their news.
The IPA will not, at least initially, be empowered to regulate platforms or other actors in the 
public domain. Its role will be to evaluate the overall environment of news production and 
circulation, to advise regulators and government, and to make proposals for change that can 
take effect over the long-term and that may give rise to decisions to introduce new regulatory 
structures. 
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Specifically, the IPA would be expected to have a major impact by improving the transparency 
of the platforms’ operations. Regular reports to agreed standards of detail are urgently 
needed, and the IPA would also serve as a ’clearing house’, coordinating information about 
the impacts of monitoring and assessment conducted by other institutions. The IPA would 
help to safeguard citizens’ rights while also ensuring there is an accountability framework for 
interventions such as, for example, ranking up credible content and warning against other 
content. The IPA’s role would enhance transparency through its reporting responsibilities 
about how content curation judgements are made. This would enable citizens and other 
stakeholders to know who is making decisions about online moderation and curation (and on 
what basis), and whether those decisions are timely and effective.
The IPA should be established by legislation
It should have the following duties: 
■■ Report on trends in news and information sharing according to a methodological 
framework subject to public consultation. This could include, for example, data on the 
most shared and read stories, broken down by demographic group.
■■ Report on the effectiveness of self-regulation of the major news-carrying social and 
search platforms. This should include reports on trust marks, credibility signalling, filtering 
and takedown.
■■ Mobilise and coordinate all relevant actors to ensure an inclusive and sustained 
programme in media literacy for both children and adults, and conduct evaluations of 
initiatives. It should work with Ofcom to ensure sufficient evidence on the public’s critical 
news and information literacy.
■■ Report annually to Parliament on the performance of platforms’ self-regulation efforts and 
any long-term needs for regulatory action.
■■ Provide reports on request to other agencies such as the Electoral Commission, Ofcom 
and the Information Commissioner’s Office, to support the performance of their duties, 
according to agreed criteria. 
■■ The IPA should work closely with Ofcom and with the Competition and Markets Authority 
to monitor the level of market dominance and the impact of platforms on media plurality 
and quality. 
The IPA should report on trends in online news and information 
sharing and the effectiveness of self-regulation
The IPA would collaborate with existing regulators to report on the effectiveness of self-
regulation and news credibility signalling measures across the UK media system. The IPA 
should be empowered to make recommendations to Government, or relevant regulators, 
about the legal duties of platforms, and to monitor compliance with those duties, once 
legislated for. The IPA’s role will encourage content moderation based on principles and a 
taxonomy of misinformation, disinformation and mal-information, including hate speech, 
based on source, content and intent of the material involved. Platforms should have a duty 
to identify the source and identity of posts and accounts in a way that allows anonymous, 
but verified, user accounts, in order to protect vulnerable categories of users and addresses 
Ofcom survey data 
indicates that in 
the UK, TV is the 
most used news 
platform	(79%),	
with the internet 
being the next 
most used overall 
by all age groups 
(64%)
UHDTV
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used in closed apps. The IPA would oversee and monitor practices for the filtering, removal of 
user accounts or content, flagging, warnings, up- or down-ranking of material, and changes 
to algorithms or their design and accessibility. It would provide annual assessments of the 
outcomes of moderation activities to Parliament, the Electoral Commission, Ofcom and other 
relevant bodies and to the public. 
Government should mobilise and coordinate an integrated new 
programme in media literacy
Production-side approaches to the UK’s information deficit will not be effective on their own. 
Citizens also need to be empowered to evaluate critically the information that reaches them, 
and the media environment that lies behind that information. To this end, Government should 
convene and fund an integrated new programme in media literacy as the fourth pillar of 
education alongside reading, writing and maths.
The Department for Education should lead an inclusive educational framework to build digital 
literacy and the IPA would coordinate work with the BBC and public service broadcasters, 
libraries, the National Literacy Trust and the platforms. This curricula effort across the UK 
needs to connect the areas where literacy is addressed, such as media studies, computer 
studies and citizenship. There needs to be a focus on both children in schools – for example, 
a compulsory media literacy module in citizenship classes – but also on adults in further 
and vocational education. A new integrated programme in media literacy needs to reach out 
to groups not in education or training and especially hard-to-reach groups. Both platforms 
and civil society organisations need to be incorporated into a programme that could include 
the provision and use of media literacy toolkits to integrate media literacy into wider social 
activism and services. The funding for a new programme could come from general taxation, 
philanthropy or via a portion of the platform levy. 
The IPA would assess and evaluate the platforms’ role in promoting media literacy to 
highlight both good and bad practice. Oversight is needed to establish a baseline and minimal 
expectations of improvement for the whole population and those who are particularly low 
in media literacy. The IPA would track improvements through independent evaluations of 
initiatives to learn which work and why, and make recommendations as needed to bodies 
providing media literacy support. It would track improvements by working with Ofcom or 
complementing Ofcom’s research to ensure sufficient evidence on the public’s critical news 
and information literacy.
The IPA would coordinate the development of targeted media literacy assistance to groups 
who fall beyond the reach of Department for Education, civil society and platform-led 
initiatives in formal education, also extending to provision of informal training to politicians 
and policy-makers. Parliamentary discussions and committee hearings in the UK following 
the 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal, in the US Congress and at the European Parliament, 
revealed shockingly low levels of media literacy and understanding among senior 
parliamentarians and policy-makers. By issuing regular policy research reports and briefings 
and reporting directly to Parliament, the IPA would ensure that politicians and future policy-
making are better informed. 
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Legislative change is needed to regulate political advertising 
Electoral regulation in the UK is diffuse and unfit for purpose. Regulation is spread across a 
number of institutions resulting in regulatory blind spots. The Government should act urgently 
to introduce legislation supporting a mandatory code for political advertising before the next 
election. The Electoral Commission needs the powers to act quickly in response to emerging 
risks including requiring spending information and accountability on online advertisements 
during elections and referendums by foreign organisations and individuals. Legislation 
is needed to ensure greater transparency of the sources of information produced and 
circulated on the platforms during an election. Legislation should include provisions, subject 
to assessment of impact, for levying heavier fines on organisations or individuals who break 
the law. In addition, the Government should introduce legislation to enable the Advertising 
Standards Authority (ASA) and the Electoral Commission to create a new standards code 
for political advertising online. The IPA would help to coordinate evaluation of the impacts 
of micro-targeting (as well as general advertising) to ensure that guidelines and limits are 
appropriate for use in political contexts. It would also help to encourage the introduction 
of a UK political advertising directory and monitor outcomes of the initiatives of relevant 
institutions to ensure that those such as Google’s database, Ad Library, are independently 
overseen.
To fulfil its duties, the IPA will need the following: 
■■ Powers to request data from all the major platforms (determined by a UK advertising 
revenue threshold) on the top most shared news and information stories, referrals, 
news-sharing trends and case studies of particular stories. The types of data should 
be determined on the basis of public consultation on monitoring methodologies and 
according to a shared template that applies across different companies above the 
threshold. These data will be held by the IPA within a tight confidentiality regime to protect 
privacy and commercial sensitivities.
■■ Powers to impose fines on platforms if they fail to provide data, and to request additional 
data when a court order is granted. 
■■ The IPA’s independence from government should be established in law and protected 
financially and through security of tenure of the Board. The IPA should have close links 
with civil society and be transparent about how it interprets and performs its remit.
The IPA will have the power to require reporting data from the platforms with regard to the 
nature and extent of disinformation so that its scale and provenance are known. Reporting 
would encompass fake online profiles, bots and indicate known foreign involvement. The 
IPA would report publicly on any failures by the platforms to report disinformation within 24 
hours and have powers to levy fines for non-compliance. The IPA would report annually to 
Parliament according to a scheme agreed with Parliament. The IPA would monitor platform 
policies and practices as a result of its access to agreed data. The IPA would reach agreement 
on what information, at what level of detail, must be provided by the platforms. Such an 
agreement would recognise that company commercial interests in keeping certain details 
private need to be respected and negotiated, and that citizens’ interests in privacy must be 
protected in accordance with legal provisions. 
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The IPA would have a central role in undertaking or commissioning evaluations of the 
outcomes of specific policy initiatives and their interactions. Robust evidence on the influence 
of news media and misinformation in the UK is still lacking; the IPA would be charged with 
gathering that evidence.
Evidence must be independently produced with academic rigour for the benefit of the public 
and other stakeholders including the platforms. The IPA would play a key role in facilitating the 
relationship between the platforms and researchers in the UK, and provide a forum for debate 
with a wide range of stakeholders and the public. It would coordinate closely with research 
centres such as the UK Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation that has a key role in establishing 
codes of conduct for the future design of the technologies that support platform services.
5.2.2 In addition to establishing the new IPA, recommendations for 
short-term action
■■ The news media should continue their important work to develop high-quality and 
innovative revenue and distribution models. They should also continue to work with civil 
society and the platforms on signalling the credibility of content.
■■ The platforms should develop annual plans and transparent, open mission statements 
on how they plan to tackle misinformation. They should work with civil society and news 
providers to develop trust marking. 
■■ The Government should mobilise an urgent, integrated, new programme in media literacy. 
This could also be funded by the social platform levy and include digital media literacy 
training for politicians. 
■■ Parliament should bring forward legislation to reform electoral regulation. The UK 
should not find itself having to go to the polls again before the legislative framework is 
modernised. Legislative change is needed to manage political advertising.
5.2.3 Recommendations for the medium term (3 years)
Once the IPA is established it can help to mobilise efforts to encourage the traditional news 
industry to develop ways of supporting journalism innovation to combat the information crisis. 
This crisis has seen mounting numbers of interventions aimed at promoting the circulation of 
misinformation, disinformation and mal-information that contributes to the undermining of an 
informed public. 
The IPA would work to encourage the news industry to establish a News Innovation Centre 
operated by the news industry itself to support journalism innovation and quality news. 
The Centre would act as a research and networking body, helping connect journalists and 
news organisations with funders interested in supporting innovation, training and specialist 
journalism. The Centre would generate and administer funding from philanthropists, the 
platforms and other sources.
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5.2.4 Recommendations for the longer term (5 years)
The IPA would provide vital coordination with all parts of the complex media system that are 
affected by the information crisis. The IPA is needed to start the short-term measures and 
to encourage the other measures for the medium term. The issues addressed will remain 
matters of long-term concern, requiring continuing coordination and assessment of the 
effectiveness of the recommended actions.
■■ The IPA should provide a permanent forum for monitoring and review of platform 
behaviours, reporting to Parliament on an annual basis. 
■■ The IPA should be asked to conduct annual reviews of ‘the state of disinformation’ that 
should include policy recommendations to a parliamentary committee. These should 
encompass positive interventions such as the funding of journalism.
In light of the experience of how the initial interventions bed down, it may be necessary 
to subject platforms to much more stringent regulation, including making them liable for 
content they host, obliging them to unbundle or separate internal divisions, or even breaking 
up their business units or introducing a more comprehensive system of tax incentives. The 
IPA would provide a permanent forum for monitoring and review of platform behaviours, 
reporting to Parliament on an annual basis. The IPA would work closely with Ofcom, the 
Electoral Commission, consumer groups and the Competition and Markets Authority. Key 
to its reporting will be the need to monitor the level of market dominance and the impact of 
platforms on media plurality and quality. 
The IPA would provide a means of working with the responses of UK (and where necessary, 
international) institutions to augment them by providing support and providing evaluation 
capacity and reporting which are autonomous of the Government and do not require any 
new regulation or licensing of content. It would be autonomous of the platforms, relying on 
voluntary agreements with them initially. Over time, it is possible that the IPA would develop 
beyond a ‘monitoring and information’ function into a regulatory function.
The Government 
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Conclusion6
This Commission is firmly and unanimously against the establishment 
of any regulator that is formally linked to government or which has, as its 
goal, active regulation of ‘truth’.
It is for Parliament, with cross-party support, to empower an independent institution with the 
tools it needs to support existing actions of the media, platforms and civil society. The new 
institution – the IPA – would work with a range of stakeholders to foster the resilience of our 
information environment and do so in a manner consistent with democratic values. 
These sensitive actions must not be carried out by a ministry, by senior ministers or by 
politicians making deals without oversight. They must be supported by research and 
oversight that is independent from narrow political interests, open and transparent, with a 
tightly defined remit. 
The alternative to setting up a transparent institution that is independent of government and 
established by law will be to continue with muddling through and opaque fudging, and with 
the delegation of censorship to private bodies, further compounding the crisis of truth and 
trust. The time for decisive action to end the information crisis is now.
This report is an intervention in an ongoing debate. We welcome critical and constructive 
responses to the ideas raised. We will continue our engagement with stakeholders and 
the public as the agenda develops over the next critical period which will shape our 
information ecology. 
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Appendix 1: The Commission’s remit
This Commission is an engagement and knowledge exchange exercise funded and run by 
the LSE. It seeks to relate research in the academy, think tanks, the media and technology 
industries and elsewhere to policy-making and practice.
It has involved consultation with a wide range of practitioners, policy-makers, researchers, 
politicians, civil society organisations and members of the public through four workshops, 
public events, media appearances and commentary, and online discussion. This report aims 
to capture the results of that consultation, but it does not claim to be a comprehensive or 
representative survey of opinion. We are grateful to everyone who contributed ideas and who 
gave up their time.
While many of the issues are transnational by their nature, the focus in the report is on the UK, 
although the dissemination, engagement and follow-up work will be international.
The purpose of the report is to address current concerns, but it is also looking forward as 
a continuing agenda-setting process. The issues it deals with will change over time and so 
policy will also have to adapt. 
The report is part of a larger online and offline resource run by the LSE Media Policy Project 
in partnership with the LSE’s journalism think tank, Polis, that will act as a hub for information 
and discussion in the future based at the LSE Department of Media and Communications.
At its heart is topical information and journalism. The report sets out practical ideas, but it 
also challenges orthodoxies and addresses the larger context. It makes proposals that seek 
to stimulate debate by pushing at the boundaries of what is possible and not just likely or 
politically convenient. 
In such a fluid situation it is important to consider a range of models. The aim is to stimulate 
debate and evidence-based, public interest-focused discussion. By bringing together diverse 
sectors and perspectives, we aim to synthesise and connect, rather than to lobby for one point 
of view or interest.
As noted above, the external commissioners were advisors acting in a personal capacity and 
are not individually accountable for any element of the process or final report. Individually, they 
do not necessarily endorse the recommendations. The authorship and responsibility for the 
report rests with the LSE.
We hope that this report will make a valuable, constructive contribution to the ongoing debate 
about the information crisis, and look forward to discussing the details of the issues it raises.
Further information about the Commission including the full report, podcasts, workshop 
briefing papers and discussion summaries, a bibliography and other resources can be found 
at the LSE Commission on Truth, Trust and Technology website:
www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-communications/truth-trust-and-technology-commission
A series of blogs about policy issues related to misinformation has been published on the LSE 
Media Policy Project blog:
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/
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Appendix 2: Selected policy responses 
to the information crisis
UK Parliamentary inquiries 
House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee inquiry: Disinformation 
and ‘fake news’
The Committee’s interim report, Disinformation and ‘fake news’, was published in July 2018; 
the final report is due by the end of 2018. Key recommendations include: a re-designation of 
tech companies as neither publisher nor platform and the establishment of clear legal liability 
with regard to harmful and illegal content published on their sites; the introduction of a levy 
on social media companies to fund a major media literacy programme; a further levy on tech 
companies operating in the UK to pay for the Information Commissioner’s Office to expand 
its work; a public register for political advertising; a ban on advertising to Facebook ‘lookalike 
audiences’ where users have requested not to receive political adverts; the introduction of 
digital imprints to online election campaigning material; the Electoral Commission’s maximum 
fine limit to be changed to a fixed percentage of turnover; the Electoral Commission to 
establish a code for social media advertising during election periods; an audit of the online 
advertising market by the Competition and Market Authority regarding fake accounts; and the 
UK Government to consider a new, voluntary Atlantic Charter to protect citizens’ digital rights:
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/363/363.pdf
The Government published its response to the interim report in October 2018:
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1630/1630.pdf
House of Lords Communications Committee inquiry: The internet: to regulate or not to 
regulate?
The Committee’s work is ongoing, with its report not published as of November 2018:
www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/communications-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/the-internet-to-regulate-or-not-to-regulate/
House of Lords Communications Committee inquiry: Growing up with the internet
The Committee’s report was published in March 2017 (disclosure: Chair of the LSE Truth, 
Trust and Technology Commission, Professor Sonia Livingstone OBE, was the Committee’s 
specialist advisor). Key recommendations included: Government to create a new Children’s 
Digital Champion to advocate on behalf of children; the UK to maintain legislation 
incorporating the standards set by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), regardless 
of EU membership; the adoption by industry of a set of minimum standards; and digital 
literacy to be the fourth pillar of a child’s education.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldcomuni/130/130.pdf
The Government published its response in October 2017:
www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/communications/children-internet/
governmentresponsegrowingupwiththeinternet.pdf
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House of Commons Science and Technology Committee inquiry: Algorithms in decision-
making
The Committee’s report was published in May 2018. It calls on the new Centre for Data 
Ethics & Innovation (see below) to examine algorithm biases and transparency tools, and 
to determine the scope for individuals to be able to challenge the results of all significant 
algorithmic decisions that affect them and, where appropriate, to seek redress for the impacts 
of such decisions. It calls on the Government to provide better oversight of private sector 
algorithms that use public sector datasets, and to look at how to monetise these datasets to 
improve outcomes across Government.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmsctech/351/351.pdf
The Government published its response in September 2018:
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmsctech/1544/1544.pdf
UK Government initiatives
Digital Charter
The details of the Digital Charter were not published in November 2018, beyond a broad 
outline policy paper. The Charter is described as ‘a rolling programme of work to agree norms 
and rules for the online world and put them into practice’ and as ‘based on liberal values that 
cherish freedom, but not the freedom to harm others’. Priorities under the work programme 
include disinformation, online harms and cyber security. The development of the Charter is 
being undertaken collaboratively with industry, business and civil society.
www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-charter
White Paper on online harms (forthcoming) 
The Government’s White Paper is expected in spring 2019, according to comments made by 
DCMS Secretary of State Rt Hon Jeremy Wright QC MP’s comments before the DCMS Select 
Committee in October 2018. This will clarify what legislation the Government thinks is required 
regarding online safety, and whether or not a regulator is required. The White Paper is the joint 
responsibility of DCMS and the Home Office.
www.gov.uk/government/news/new-laws-to-make-social-media-safer
UK Council for Internet Safety (UKCIS) 
This new organisation will bring together more than 200 organisations representing 
government, regulators, industry, law enforcement, academia and charities, working together 
to keep children safe online. This builds on the work of the UK Council for Child Internet Safety 
(UKCCIS) that was previously in operation.
www.gov.uk/government/groups/uk-council-for-child-internet-safety-ukccis 
(See also a paper by Dr Victoria Baines: ‘Online child sexual exploitation: Towards an optimal 
international response.’ Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3240998)
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Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation
This is a new institution set up by Government, to ‘advise the government on how to enable 
and ensure ethical, safe and innovative uses of data, including for AI. It will work with, and 
advise, Government and existing regulators’. It will sit within DCMS for the first two years 
before being set up as a statutory body. It is to be established following a public consultation 
designed to inform its operations and priorities. 
www.gov.uk/government/news/search-for-leader-of-centre-for-data-ethics-and-
innovation-launched
Protecting the debate: Intimidation, influence, and information (Cabinet Office 
consultation)
This consultation aims to crack down on threats and abuse towards those standing for 
election. It will also ‘review whether the requirement to have imprints, which is added to 
election material to show who is responsible for producing it, should be extended to digital 
communications’. 
www.gov.uk/government/consultations/protecting-the-debate-intimidation-influence-
and-information#history
Digital competition expert panel 
Chaired by Professor Jason Furman, the expert panel’s objectives are to consider the potential 
opportunities and challenges the digital economy may pose for competition and pro-
competition policy, and to make recommendations on any changes needed. This is a joint HM 
Treasury/Department for Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy initiative. The panel is 
due to report in early 2019.
www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-competition-expert-panel-terms-of-
reference/digital-competition-expert-panel-terms-of-reference
Press sustainability: The Cairncross review 
The review, chaired by Dame Frances Cairncross, is established to investigate the 
sustainability of the UK press market. To inform the review, DCMS commissioned academic 
research to look specifically at the changing state of the press market. The panel is due to 
report in early 2019.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/687330/TERMS_OF_REFERENCE_-_THE_CAIRNCROSS_REVIEW.pdf
AI Lab
Described as a single flagship for Artificial Intelligence, machine learning and data science in 
defence to be based at Dstl (Defence, Science and Technology laboratory) in Porton Down. 
Countering fake news is included in the list of work that the Lab will engage in.
www.gov.uk/government/news/flagship-ai-lab-announced-as-defence-secretary-hosts-
first-meet-between-british-and-american-defence-innovators
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National Security Communications Unit
Announced in January 2018, the intention is that this new initiative will be tasked with 
‘combating disinformation by state actors and others’, according to a Government spokesman. 
Further information is yet to be published.
Institutional responses
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
The ICO’s investigation into data analytics in political campaigns led to the publication of 
a progress report in July 2018, to inform the DCMS Select Committee inquiry with which 
it overlapped. Based on its investigation, the ICO fined Facebook £500,000. A second 
report, Democracy Disrupted? Personal Information and Political Influence included a 
recommendation that the Government introduce a statutory Code of Practice for the use 
of personal data in political campaigns, and a third report in November 2018 repeated 
that call, arguing that self-regulation was inadequate and saying that the Code should 
include platforms, data brokers and the media. 
https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/07/findings-
recommendations-and-actions-from-ico-investigation-into-data-analytics-in-political-
campaigns/   
https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf  
https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-use-of-data-
analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf
Ofcom
In September 2018, Ofcom published a discussion document about online harmful content. 
This was based on its experience of regulating the UK communications sector and was 
intended to inform policy-making as it relates to online.
www.ofcom.org.uk/phones-telecoms-and-internet/information-for-industry/internet-
policy/addressing-harmful-online-content
An accompanying speech by Ofcom Chief Executive Sharon White to the Royal Television 
Society provides context:
www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/speeches/2018/tackling-online-harm
Electoral Commission
The Electoral Commission’s Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters report 
calls for stronger powers for obtaining information about election campaign spending, greater 
fines for breaches of spending laws, more detailed and more punctual reporting on spending, 
and better labelling of digital campaign materials and ads. It was published in June 2018.
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/244594/Digital-
campaigning-improving-transparency-for-voters.pdf
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Commission on Fake News and the teaching of critical literacy skills in schools
Jointly run by the National Literacy Trust and the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Literacy, 
the Commission’s report was published in June 2018. Recommendations focus on the need 
for critical literacy to be taught in schools, including the use of a range of texts on a variety of 
platforms that illustrate political bias. It calls for media organisations and Government to work 
together to identify and enforce appropriate regulatory options to ensure that digital media 
platforms are effectively tackling the proliferation of fake news.
https://literacytrust.org.uk/research-services/research-reports/fake-news-and-critical-
literacy-final-report/
UK think tank and NGO responses
Doteveryone
Doteveryone’s Regulating for responsible technology report was published in October 2018. It 
recommends the establishment of a new independent UK Office for Responsible Technology 
(ORT), which would have three functions: (1) to empower regulators; (2) to inform the public 
and policy-makers; and (3) to support people to find redress. Doteveryone proposes that the 
ORT’s anticipated cost (c. £37 million) would be met via a levy on industry, and by government 
investment.
https://doteveryone.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Doteveryone-Regulating-for-
Responsible-Tech-Report.pdf
Article 19
Article 19 published Self-regulation and ‘hate speech’ on social media platforms, which 
recommended a model of self-regulation of social media, based on existing systems of press 
self-regulatory councils that are common throughout Europe.
www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Self-regulation-and-%E2%80%98hate-
speech%E2%80%99-on-social-media-platforms_March2018.pdf
Carnegie UK Trust (William Perrin and Professor Lorna Woods)
Via a series of blogs for the Carnegie UK Trust, Perrin and Woods propose legislation to 
create a duty of care based on (new) statute, so that social media service providers would be 
responsible for preventing harm of their users. The proposal would apply the same principles 
to online platforms that have traditionally been applied to corporate-owned public spaces, in 
order that harm can be prevented.
www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/project/harm-reduction-in-social-media/
Global Partners Digital 
The report A rights-respecting model of online content regulation by platforms calls for 
online platforms to establish a set of standards that would be monitored by an international, 
global multistakeholder oversight body, comprising representatives from online platforms, 
civil society organisations, academia and others. Platforms that failed to meet the standards 
would be publicly called out and provided with recommendations for improvement.
www.gp-digital.org/publication/a-rights-respecting-model-of-online-content-regulation-
by-platforms
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Full Fact
The report Tackling misinformation in an open society recommends mandated transparency 
for political advertising, equipping existing bodies (e.g. Office for Budget Responsibility, Office 
for National Statistics, House of Commons Library) with a mandate to inform the public, and 
cautions against over-hasty reaction. 
https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/full_fact_tackling_misinformation_in_an_open_
society.pdf
Royal Society of Arts (RSA)
Focussing on contentious use, the Artificial Intelligence: Real public engagement report argues 
that the citizen voice must be embedded in public AI systems through public deliberation.
www.thersa.org/discover/publications-and-articles/reports/artificial-intelligence-real-
public-engagement
European initiatives
France
France’s National Assembly adopted two controversial ‘fake news’ bills in October 2018, which 
must be approved by the Senate before they become law. The bills enable a candidate or 
political party to seek a court injunction preventing the publication of ‘false information’ during 
the three months leading up to a national election, and give France’s broadcast authority the 
power to take any network that is ‘controlled by, or under the influence of a foreign power’ off 
the air if it ‘deliberately spreads false information that could alter the integrity of the election.’ 
They are widely viewed as targeting Russian state-backed broadcaster RT. French minister of 
culture Françoise Nyssen has also announced her intention to create a council on press ethics. 
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/dossiers/fausses_informations_lutte
Germany
The Network Enforcement Act, known as NetzDG, compels online platforms to provide ways 
for users to notify them of illegal content, and allows for fines of up to €50 million if they fail to 
remove ‘manifestly unlawful’ hate speech or other harmful content within 24 hours. They are 
required to publicly report on how they deal with notifications. The law has been criticised by 
NGOs for being overbroad and increasing the risk of censorship.
www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=2
European Union
The Copyright Directive calls for a ‘link tax’ that aims to ensure that content creators receive 
are paid when their work is used by sharing platforms such as YouTube or Facebook, and 
news aggregators such as Google News. (The European Parliament has voted in favour but 
the final vote is due in January 2019.)
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180906IPR12103/parliament-adopts-
its-position-on-digital-copyright-rules
An interim Digital Services Tax has been proposed by the European Commission that would 
apply to revenues created from certain digital activities that escape the current tax framework 
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entirely, for example, from selling online advertising space, from digital intermediary activities 
that allow users to interact with other users and that can facilitate the sale of goods and 
services between them, or from the sale of data generated from user-provided information. 
This has been proposed at 3%. It would be an interim measure until reform has been 
implemented. It is currently under negotiation, and has been criticised by the tech companies.
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/proposal_common_system_
digital_services_tax_21032018_en.pdf
The European Commission convened a High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online 
Disinformation that reported in March 2018. It focused mainly on non-regulatory responses, 
with recommendations including the creation of a network of Research Centres focused on 
studying disinformation across the EU, the continuation of the work of the Group by means of 
a multistakeholder coalition that will establish a code of practice for platforms, empowering 
users and journalists with tools they can use to flag and avoid disinformation, and increasing 
citizen media and information literacy. 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-
fake-news-and-online-disinformation
Tackling online disinformation: A European approach – a communication in which the 
European Commission outlined its policy responses. Its aims included establishing a self-
regulatory code of practice (see below), creating a network of independent fact-checkers, 
tackling cyber-enabled threats to elections in member states, media literacy work such as 
organising a European Week of Media Literacy, and exploring increased funding opportunities 
to support initiatives promoting media freedom and pluralism, quality news media and 
journalism. The Commission will report on progress made by December 2018.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236
The self-regulatory Code of practice on disinformation was published by the European 
Commission in September 2018. Signatories, including Google, Facebook, Twitter and Mozilla, 
commit to act in five areas: disrupting advertising revenues of certain accounts and websites 
that spread disinformation; making political advertising and issue-based advertising more 
transparent; addressing the issue of fake accounts and online bots; empowering consumers 
to report disinformation and access different news sources, while improving the visibility and 
findability of authoritative content; and empowering the research community to monitor online 
disinformation through privacy-compliant access to the platforms’ data.
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation
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